Global fertiliser supply chains—often overlooked outside agricultural circles—are increasingly influencing international diplomacy and trade policy.
From the wheat fields of Kansas to the potash mines of Saskatchewan and the gas reserves of Qatar, a complex network of dependencies links global food production to geopolitical stability. Disruptions to fertiliser flows from the Middle East are now emerging as a strategic concern that could reshape Washington’s relations with both Canada and Russia.
The United States remains one of the world’s most productive agricultural powers, yet its food system depends heavily on imported fertiliser inputs.
While the country produces most of its anhydrous ammonia domestically, it relies on imports for more than 95% of its potash requirements. Canada dominates this supply chain, accounting for over 80% of U.S. potash imports, while Russia and Belarus together provide roughly 15%, according to Statista data.
Nitrogen fertilisers present a different but equally significant dependency. In 2024 alone, the United States imported 1.29 million metric tons of urea from Russia, representing about 25% of total imports, according to the USDA. The trend continued in 2025, with Russia accounting for over 27% of U.S. urea imports during the first four months of the year.
Historically, Middle Eastern producers—including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE—have supplied a large share of additional nitrogen fertilisers to the U.S. market, supported by their access to low-cost natural gas feedstocks.
However, tensions in the region and potential disruptions to shipping routes—particularly through the Strait of Hormuz—are now threatening these supply flows.
The timing is particularly sensitive. American farmers apply the majority of nitrogen fertiliser during the spring planting season, meaning that disruptions between February and May could translate directly into lower crop yields later in the year.
Meanwhile, trade policies have further complicated the landscape. Fertiliser tariffs introduced in April 2025 imposed duties ranging from 10% to 15% on most suppliers, with some products facing charges of up to 30%. Notably, Russian fertiliser exports were exempted from these measures, effectively increasing Moscow’s market share.
Canada’s role in the fertiliser equation remains equally critical. As the dominant supplier of potash to the United States, Ottawa holds considerable leverage in agricultural trade negotiations. A potential 25% tariff on Canadian potash, analysts warn, could increase fertiliser costs by over $100 per ton, ultimately affecting U.S. farmers and food prices.
At the same time, Russia has begun linking fertiliser trade to broader geopolitical negotiations. During recent diplomatic talks in Riyadh, the United States committed to facilitating Russia’s return to global fertiliser markets as part of discussions surrounding a potential Ukraine ceasefire.
The Kremlin has explicitly demanded the removal of restrictions on fertiliser exports, as well as the lifting of limitations affecting maritime insurance, port access, and agricultural equipment exports to Russia.
This dynamic reveals a deeper strategic reality: fertiliser supply is no longer simply an agricultural issue—it is becoming a negotiating tool in global geopolitics.
Disruptions to Middle Eastern fertiliser production could further accelerate this trend, forcing the United States to rely more heavily on Canada and Russia to maintain agricultural output.
The consequences extend beyond farming. Shifts in fertiliser supply routes could reshape global shipping flows, potentially increasing maritime transport distances and altering logistics patterns.
Grain shipments to the Middle East, for instance, may increasingly bypass the Strait of Hormuz, relying instead on longer multimodal routes through the Red Sea and Mediterranean ports.
Ultimately, the intersection of fertiliser supply, agricultural production and geopolitics highlights a growing reality: food security and foreign policy are now deeply intertwined.
