When the original framework for tracking Venezuelan trade flows was published on 6 January, the geopolitical outlook was uncertain. Since then, events have moved faster and more dramatically than many expected, and Venezuelan oil has become far more important to the market than initially anticipated.
The turning point came on 3 January 2026, when the US launched Operation Absolute Resolve, a military strike on Caracas that resulted in the capture of Nicolás Maduro, who was then taken to New York to face drug-trafficking charges.
That single event altered the course of every signal being monitored.
Signal 1 — Political rhetoric
Status: In active flux — cautious détente underway
Delcy Rodríguez, previously Venezuela’s vice president, was formally sworn in as acting president after Maduro’s removal. Her more balanced political posture had already been identified as an important factor to watch, and that expectation has largely been borne out.
Within a month of Maduro’s capture, Rodríguez signed legislation granting foreign companies broader rights over Venezuela’s oil sector and freed hundreds of dissidents jailed under the previous government. The US later lifted sanctions against Rodríguez herself, a move widely seen as evidence of improving relations. The US embassy in Caracas also resumed operations after a seven-year closure.
Even so, more than 10 weeks after Maduro’s capture, there has been little visible progress toward a democratic transition. The shift in tone has clearly happened, but it remains fragile and highly transactional.
Signal 2 — Corporate moves
Status: Chevron moves decisively; Reliance joins in while others remain cautious
Chevron has expanded its heavy oil exposure through an asset swap with PDVSA, gaining an additional 13.21% working interest in the Petroindependencia joint venture and rights to develop the adjacent Ayacucho 8 area in the Orinoco Belt.
Shell is also expected to sign agreements to operate a gas area that Chevron is handing back, in connection with the Loran-Manatee field on the Venezuela-Trinidad border.
India’s Reliance Industries received a US OFAC licence in February 2026 allowing it to resume direct purchases of Venezuelan crude from PDVSA. This gives the company access to discounted heavy crude and supports its large refining operations. The first cargo was already loaded in April.
By contrast, ExxonMobil chief executive Darren Woods told Donald Trump at the White House that Venezuela remains “uninvestable” under its current structure, pointing to the country’s history of asset seizures. The contrast between the expansion of Chevron, Shell and Reliance and the caution of Exxon and Conoco reflects the split risk assessment that had been anticipated.
Signal 3 — Sanctions relief and policy changes
Status: Rapid, phased easing — the clearest positive signal
This is the most advanced of all seven indicators. Since January, OFAC has issued a series of General Licenses that together amount to the broadest easing of Venezuela-related sanctions in years.
The process unfolded in stages. GL 46, issued on 29 January, authorised transactions involving Venezuelan-origin oil. GL 47 on 3 February allowed the sale of US diluents to Venezuela. GL 48 on 10 February expanded relief to upstream oil and gas exploration, development and production. GL 49 on 13 February approved negotiations and entry into contingent contracts for new investment. GL 51 on 6 March authorised activities involving Venezuelan-origin gold.
Most recently, on 13 March, OFAC extended the licences again to cover exports of petrochemical and fertiliser products from Venezuela and new investment in the petrochemical and electricity sectors.
The White House has described its approach as a three-step framework: stabilisation, economic recovery and then rebuilding civil society.
Signal 4 — Private sector investment and joint ventures
Status: Emerging but complex — big capital remains cautious
On 29 January, the Venezuelan National Assembly approved sweeping reforms to the Hydrocarbons Law aimed at reversing decades of nationalisation and attracting private and foreign capital. The changes include lower taxes, greater autonomy for private producers and permission for asset transfers.
These are the kinds of structural reforms that were expected to follow any easing of sanctions. But the bigger investment picture remains difficult. As previously noted, Rystad estimates that Venezuela would need $53bn in upstream investment simply to keep production flat.
Discussions with major energy companies suggest that real production growth would require multi-year, multi-billion-dollar commitments, likely combined with debt restructuring, regulatory reform and durable bipartisan support from both the Venezuelan and US sides. Capital may be opening up, but only cautiously.
Signal 5 — Foreign exchange reserves and currency stability
Status: Deteriorating — the weakest signal
Currency stability remains one of the biggest concerns. The official bolívar exchange rate moved beyond 300 to the US dollar in January and 400 in February, representing a 37% depreciation in the first quarter alone.
Since 31 March, the Central Bank of Venezuela has sold $330m in an effort to slow the decline. Even before Maduro’s capture, the trajectory was already severe: the official exchange rate stood at 301 bolívars per dollar at the start of January 2026, compared with just 52 at the beginning of 2025, a depreciation of nearly 480% over 12 months.
Unlike the support previously provided by Washington to Argentina, the US has not stepped in to shore up Venezuelan central bank reserves. For now, currency weakness remains the most fragile part of the recovery story.
Signal 6 — Non-oil export diversification
Status: Green shoots in petrochemicals and gold; Asia geopolitics remain central
The 13 March OFAC expansion also authorised petrochemical and fertiliser exports from Venezuela, a move partly influenced by rising global commodity prices driven by the Iran conflict.
That development supports the earlier view that key markets for Venezuelan aluminium, gold and petrochemicals would be found in Asia. On 27 March, GL 51A further authorised activities involving Venezuelan-origin minerals, including gold.
At the same time, the geopolitical challenge remains exactly as expected: China and India are the most natural buyers of these non-oil commodities, while the US is trying to redirect Venezuelan trade toward American companies and allied markets.
Signal 7 — Port activity and shipping data
Status: Ports operating; infrastructure weak; visibility improving
Puerto Cabello is functioning normally, with bulk carriers, container vessels and general cargo ships calling without reported operational difficulty. La Guaira, while briefly militarised after the January strike, also continued operating. Jose Terminal has seen limited activity due to sanctions on tankers, but other ports such as Cumaná and Maracaibo remain active.
The deeper issue is infrastructure quality. Even before Maduro’s removal, container operations at Puerto Cabello that should have taken four to five hours were taking four to five days. A former chairman of the US Federal Maritime Commission described facilities there as being in shambles.
That said, port rehabilitation is now part of the discussion for US infrastructure investors, and early-stage visits to Venezuela are already under way. The visibility angle is also improving, with AIS data being closely monitored by P&I clubs and shipping analysts, making loadings from Venezuela easier to track.
Bottom line
Three months after Maduro’s capture, Signals 3 and 2 — sanctions relief and Chevron-led corporate activity — are the strongest positives. Signal 1, political rhetoric, is cautiously encouraging but still fragile. Signals 4 and 7 are moving in the right direction but will require years of capital. Signal 5, currency stability, remains a clear red flag. Signal 6 is gaining policy backing but is still exposed to Asia-US geopolitical tension.
Overall, the original seven-signal framework remains a useful lens for understanding the new Venezuelan trade reality.
